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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-3138 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ABDUL KARIEM MUHAMMUD, a/k/a Gerald Rogers 
 
Abdul Kariem Muhammud, 
                                         Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-07-cr-00062) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 28, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Abdul Kariem Muhammud pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement in 
which he waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack the judgment of conviction.  
 2 
Nevertheless, more than two years after he was sentenced, Muhammud filed a notice of 
appeal.  The government, mistakenly believing that he was appealing the denial of his § 
2255 petition, moved to enforce the waiver but failed to assert the untimeliness of what 
was an appeal from the judgment of conviction.  We are presented with the following 
questions: (1) whether the government can initially raise untimeliness in its merits brief to 
us, or must do so beforehand by motion; (2) whether a court can raise untimeliness sua 
sponte when the government has failed to do so; and (3) whether, if the appeal is not 
dismissed as untimely, Muhammud has waived his right to appeal.  Because the 
government properly raised untimeliness in its merits brief, we will dismiss the appeal 
and do not reach the other questions presented. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Muhammud was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to distribute 
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  On June 12, 
2007, he pleaded guilty to all three counts pursuant to a written plea agreement that 
contained a waiver both of appeal and collateral attack of his conviction.
1
  At the plea 
hearing, he acknowledged the waiver, and responded to the District Court’s questions 
regarding the waiver.  He was subsequently sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment,  
                                                 
1
 The waiver contains limited exceptions not applicable here. 
 3 
as stipulated in the plea agreement, and acknowledged at sentencing that his appellate 
rights were limited by the plea agreement.  He did not file a notice of appeal within ten 
days of entry of the final judgment on June 27, 2008, as then required by Rule 
4(b)(1)(A)(i).   
 Almost a year later, Muhammud filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
asserting several bases of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He argued that his petition 
should be heard, despite the waiver, because his guilty plea had been coerced by his 
attorney and entered under duress.  On August 19, 2009, the District Court granted the 
government’s motion to enforce the waiver and dismiss the petition after concluding that 
Muhammud had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his 
conviction and that upholding the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice.  On 
September 22, 2009, Muhammud filed, pro se, a notice of appeal with respect to the order 
dismissing the § 2255 petition.  We remanded the matter to the District Court to 
determine whether a certificate of appealability (“COA”) should issue.  The District Court 
denied a COA.  We then denied Muhammud’s application to us for a COA, finding that 
jurists of reason would not debate the District Court’s conclusion that he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction.   
 On June 11, 2010, Muhammud filed a notice of appeal from his judgment of 
conviction of two years earlier.  The following month, the government moved to enforce 
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the appellate waiver and for summary affirmance,
2
 and the Clerk of the Court advised the 
parties of the timeliness issue.  A motions panel referred the government’s motion to the 
merits panel and directed that the parties also brief whether we may raise sua sponte the 
timeliness requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), an issue left open in Gov’t of the Virgin 
Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010).  The government now 
challenges this appeal as untimely and, failing that, as waived. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 The time limit for filing a criminal appeal set forth in Rule 4(b) is rigid but not 
jurisdictional, and may be waived if not invoked by the government. Martinez, 620 F.3d 
at 328-29; see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007).  An untimely appeal 
must be dismissed, however, if the government objects. Martinez, 620 F.3d at 328-29.   
 Although we have not directly considered the issue, other courts of appeals have 
allowed the government to object to timeliness at any point up to and including in its 
merits brief. (See Appellee’s Br. 26-27 (collecting cases)).  We agree with that 
conclusion.  Because the government invokes Rule 4(b) in its brief, we must—and will—
dismiss this concededly untimely appeal.
3
  
                                                 
2
 The government maintains that it did not move to dismiss the appeal as untimely 
because it mistakenly believed Muhammud was again attempting to appeal the order 
dismissing his § 2255 petition.   
 
3
 Although, given this conclusion, we need not reach the remaining questions, we 
note that, albeit in dicta, we have also agreed with other courts of appeals that a court may 
sua sponte raise untimeliness under Rule 4, see Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 670 
F.3d 436, 445 n.18 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Gaytan-Garza, 652 F.3d 680, 681 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (dismissing four-year old appeal sua sponte); United States v. Mitchell, 518 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 We will dismiss the appeal as untimely.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
F.3d 740, 750-51 (10th Cir. 2008), and have already found, in the context of his collateral 
attack, that the waiver Muhammud acknowledged was knowing and voluntary.  Enforcing 
that waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 
529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008).   
